




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Mikro II, lecture 8a

The anatomy of an economic model

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Plan for the lecture

- 1 Present the anatomy of an economic model
- 2 Application



Introduction

- Different to Micro I, throughout Micro II we look at a range of different economic models
- We now discuss the anatomy of an economic model (a framework to put different models into) in order to:
 - Clarify the structure, similarities and differences of models
 - Help to understand the solution of models
 - A guide but not a formal mathematical breakdown



Parts of an economic model

- A model is a collection of definitions and assumptions
 - 1 Technology and Preferences
 - Exogenous variables / functions / relationships: Utility functions, production technology, initial endowments, budget sets, etc.
 - Endogenous variables: Consumption, production and sales, labor supply, etc.
 - 2 Behavior and Equilibrium
 - Agents' decisions: Maximizing what? With regard to what? What is taken as given? $\Rightarrow$ Solution provides conditional behavior
 - Equilibrium conditions: What should apply such that the agents' decisions are in an equilibrium with each other?



A model's anatomy

Technology and Preferences	Behavior and Equilibrium
<i>Exogenous functions / var. / relationships:</i> <i>Endogenous variables:</i>	<i>The decisions of the agents:</i> ↪ <i>Conditional behavior:</i> <i>Equilibrium Conditions:</i>



Example: Edgeworth economy

- Edgeworth economy with 2 goods and 2 consumers with Cobb-Douglas preferences:
 - Two agents: A and B ; two goods, 1 and 2; consumption plans: (x_1^A, x_2^A) , (x_1^B, x_2^B)
 - Cobb-Douglas utility functions:
 $u_A(x_1^A, x_2^A) = (x_1^A)^\alpha (x_2^A)^{1-\alpha}$ and $u_B(x_1^B, x_2^B) = (x_1^B)^\beta (x_2^B)^{1-\beta}$
 - Endowments: (e_1^A, e_2^A) , (e_1^B, e_2^B)
 - Possible states (sometimes only implicitly assumed):

$$e_1^A + e_1^B = x_1^A + x_1^B \quad \text{and} \quad e_2^A + e_2^B = x_2^A + x_2^B$$
$$x_1^A, x_2^A, x_1^B, x_2^B \geq 0$$



Example: Edgeworth economy

Technology and Preferences	Behavior and Equilibrium
<i>Exogenous func./var./relationships:</i> $u_A(x_1^A, x_2^A) = (x_1^A)^\alpha (x_2^A)^{1-\alpha}$ $u_B(x_1^B, x_2^B) = (x_1^B)^\beta (x_2^B)^{1-\beta}$ $\alpha, \beta, e_1^A, e_2^A, e_1^B, e_2^B$ Restrictions on possible states <i>Endogenous variables:</i> $(x_1^A, x_2^A), (x_1^B, x_2^B)$	<i>The decisions of the agents:</i> $\hookrightarrow$ <i>Conditional behavior:</i> <i>Equilibrium Conditions:</i>



Interesting analyses are possible already

- Only left side filled: No assumptions about behavior and equilibrium yet
- *Important point:* We can already answer interesting questions:
 - What (possible) states are efficient? (Contract curve)
 - Comparative statics: how does the contract curve change if β increases (or if other parameters change)



Example: Walras equilibrium in an Edgeworth economy

- Standard assumptions about behavior and equilibrium: Walras equilibrium
 - Prices p_1, p_2 are taken as given by the agents
- The agents choose consumption by maximizing utility given prices and budget condition, e.g. for A:

$$\max_{x_1^A, x_2^A} u_A(x_1^A, x_2^A) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad p_1 x_1^A + p_2 x_2^A = p_1 e_1^A + p_2 e_2^A$$

giving rise to demand functions: $x_1^{A*}(p_1, p_2), x_2^{A*}(p_1, p_2)$

- Prices adjust such that there is equilibrium in the goods markets:

$$x_1^{A*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) + x_1^{B*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) = e_1^A + e_1^B$$

$$x_2^{A*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) + x_2^{B*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) = e_2^A + e_2^B$$



Example: Walras equilibrium in an Edgeworth economy

Technology and Preferences	Behavior and Equilibrium
<i>Exogenous func./var./relationships:</i> $u_A(x_1^A, x_2^A) = (x_1^A)^\alpha (x_2^A)^{1-\alpha}$ $u_B(x_1^B, x_2^B) = (x_1^B)^\beta (x_2^B)^{1-\beta}$ $\alpha, \beta, e_1^A, e_2^A, e_1^B, e_2^B$ Restrictions on possible states <i>Endogenous variables:</i> $(x_1^A, x_2^A), (x_1^B, x_2^B)$ p_1, p_2	<i>The decisions of the agents:</i> A maximizes $u_A(x_1^A, x_2^A)$ wrt. (x_1^A, x_2^A) given budget and prices B maximizes $u_B(x_1^B, x_2^B)$ wrt. (x_1^B, x_2^B) given budget and prices ↪ <i>Conditional behavior:</i> $x_1^{A*}(p_1, p_2), x_2^{A*}(p_1, p_2)$ $x_1^{B*}(p_1, p_2), x_2^{B*}(p_1, p_2)$ <i>Equilibrium Conditions:</i> $x_1^{A*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) + x_1^{B*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) = e_1^A + e_1^B$ $x_2^{A*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) + x_2^{B*}(p_1^*, p_2^*) = e_2^A + e_2^B$



Solution and further analysis

- From the decision assumptions we can derive the demand functions for A and B
- Along with the equilibrium condition, this gives the Walras equilibrium $\Rightarrow$ the model's prediction of what is going to happen
- Can also answer other interesting questions
 - Compare the Walras equilibrium with the efficient states (first welfare theorem)
 - Comparative statics: how does the equilibrium price change if e_1^A increases? What if e_1^B increases?



Socratic Quiz question

Think of the principal agent model in slides 5a in which the principal tries to distinguish between high and low productivity workers. Which of the following is *not* exogenous in the model?

- a) q (fraction of high productivity workers)
- b) $u_H(w_H, e_H)$ (utility function of the high type)
- c) r_L Outside option of the low type
- d) e_L Effort of the low type
- e) $f(e)$ Product of effort



Example: Monopoly with constant MC

- Simple monopoly model from previous monopoly Slides:
 - Price and quantity, p and x
 - Inverse demand: $p(x)$
 - Cost Function $C(x) = c \cdot x$



Monopoly with constant MC I

Technology and Preferences	Behavior and Equilibrium
<i>Exogenous func./var./relationships:</i> $p(x), C(x) = c \cdot x$ c (implicitly also $x \geq 0$) <i>Endogenous variables:</i> x, p	<i>The decisions of the agents:</i> ↪ <i>Conditional behavior:</i> <i>Equilibrium Conditions:</i>



Interesting analyses possible already

- Left side only filled: No assumptions about behavior and equilibrium yet
- But again: We can already answer interesting questions:
 - What will the profit and consumer surplus be if 5 units are sold at a price of 4?
 - What is the efficient level for the quantity traded?
 - Comparative statics: how does the efficient level change if c rises?



Monopoly with constant MC II

Technology and Preferences	Behavior and Equilibrium
<i>Exogenous func./var./relationships:</i> $p(x), C(x) = c \cdot x$ c (implicitly also $x \geq 0, p \geq 0$) <i>Endogenous variables:</i> x, p	<i>The decisions of the agents:</i> Profit maximization: $\max_{x,p} p \cdot x - C(x)$ s.t. $p = p(x)$ ↪ <i>Conditional behavior:</i> The monopolist's quantity choice x^* and price choice $p^* = p(x^*)$ <i>Equilibrium Conditions:</i>



Monopoly with constant MC II, alternative version

Technology and Preferences	Behavior and Equilibrium
<i>Exogenous func./var./relationships:</i> $p(x), C(x) = c \cdot x$ c (implicitly also $x \geq 0$) <i>Endogenous variables:</i> x, p	<i>The decisions of the agents:</i> Profitmax: $\max_x p(x)x - C(x)$ $\hookrightarrow$ <i>Conditional behavior:</i> The monopolist's quantity choice x^* <i>Equilibrium Conditions:</i> Equilibrium price follows from the demand curve $p^* = p(x^*)$



The anatomy is not unique

- One can argue that $p^* = p(x^*)$ is the behavior of the monopolist or that it is an equilibrium condition
- This depends on how we interpret the math:
 - The monopolist chooses how much he wants to sell and offers this in the market (e. g. through an auction) and an equilibrium price arises
 - ... or the monopolist chooses how much he wants to sell and also chooses his price
- Point: There is not necessarily just one way of putting the model into the chart



What have we learned?

- An anatomy (a framework) that we can use to categorize and compare our different models

